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ABSTRACT
A commonly shared component of antivirus suites is a local
database of malware signatures that is used during the static
analysis process. Despite possible encryption, heuristic ob-
fuscation, or attempts to hide this database from malicious
end-users (or competitors), a currently avoidable eventual-
ity for offline static analysis is a need to use the contents of
the database in local computation to detect malicious files.
This work1 serves as a preliminary exploration of the use of
concolic execution as a general-case technique for reverse-
engineering malware signature database contents: indeed,
the existence of a practical technique to such an end would
certainly require the use of true (in the sense of provable se-
curity) obfuscation in order for malware databases to remain
private against capable attackers–a major obstacle given the
scarcity of truly practical secure obfuscation constructions.
Our work, however, only shows that existing tools (at the
time of this report) for concolic execution have severe limi-
tations which prevent the realization of this strategy.
Given eventual local execution, concolic execution–the (at
least partial) treatment of inputs as symbolic logical vari-
ables as they are propagated through a program– presents
itself as a possible means of generating inputs or modifi-
cations of inputs to antivirus software that are capable of
triggering (or avoiding) detection by satisfying the logical
constraints required to reach the desired result.
In this project, work has been performed to (1) identify a
generally applicable strategy for applying concolic execution
to trigger or avoid static detection in any antivirus suite, (2)
explore the feasibility of this strategy with respect to cur-
rent limits to concolic execution, and (3) propose potential
schemes to improve its efficacy. To achieve these, the devised
strategy was applied to three of the largest concolic execu-
tion suites: Angr[3], Triton[2] , and S2E[1] in an attempt to
1This report corresponds to an undergraduate project com-
pleted in the Columbia University IDS Lab in 2015.
trigger detection in the open-source AV suite ClamAV in a
minimal Ubuntu version 14 environment.
As we have already noted, each framework was noted to
have fallen short of achieving the desired goal due to both
ad-hoc, framework-specific issues and larger problems that
pervade concolic execution of large systems more generally.
Given the common shortcomings between the three frame-
works, two main blocking areas were identified, and prelim-
inary suggestions for solutions have been proposed, along
with consideration of additional issues that may arise.
Background
Concolic Execution
Figure 1: Conventional Execution
Above is a figure of generic conventional execution: a pro-
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gram (say, a malware scanner) takes two inputs, X and Y.
Given these inputs, program control moves between basic
blocks until a program endpoint is reached.
Figure 2: Concolic Execution
As shown above, concolic execution is a modification of con-
ventional execution in which a subset of inputs are treated as
symbolic logical variables and propagated through the pro-
gram. In concolic execution of a program having more than
one possible path, there is no one deterministic path which
the program follows. Instead, execution follows a symbolic
path, the symbolic variables being augmented according to
operations performed in basic blocks and required state to
perform the necessary branches along the path.
As a hard example, consider the scenario pictured in figure 2.
The program receives concrete input X and symbolic input
Y. Imagine that there is a target path of interest * from
main to Endpoint 2 as pictured in figure 2.
At edge 1, Y = C(∗, 1, Y ), which is defined the set of logical
operations performed on Y in main plus the logical con-
straints on Y required for control to branch to edge 1.
At edge 2, Y = C(∗, 2, Y ), which is defined as the set of logi-
cal operations performed on C(*,1,Y) in the basic block plus
the logical constraints on Y required for control to branch
to Endpoint 2.
At Endpoint 2, Y is a logical expression, the satisfiable2 as-
signment to which is a program input which would cause the
2 Satisfiability is NP-complete; current symbolic execution
engines use approximation to achieve satisfiable assignment.
A common technique is to express constraints in the format
of satisfiability modulo theorems (SMT) and use Microsoft’s
Z3 SMT solver.
program to reach Endpoint 2 during conventional execution.
Method
In order to test the feasibility of using concolic analysis to
coerce detection, the following overarching strategy was ap-
plied using three different symbolic execution frameworks:
1. Perform limited manual analysis on the clamscan ex-
ecutable to determine (1) relevant regions of memory
to mark as symbolic and (2) the desired (detection)
endpoint.
2. Generate a minimal signature database including only
a single hex-match rule for a short string.
3. Configure and run framework analysis on the clamscan
executable using a concrete database file (generated in
2.) and a symbolic file, with the target path endpoint
determined in 1.
4. Collect logical constraint output and generate fake mal-
ware (or re-generate the original test string from 2.).
Framework 1: Angr
Angr is a user-friendly symbolic execution framework which
abstracts the entire process of symbolic execution. It achieves
symbolic execution via the following workflow:
1. Load binary to be analyzed.
2. Translate the binary to an intermediate representation.
3. Translate the intermediate representation to a seman-
tic representation.
4. Perform analysis.
In order to perform instrumentation and perform binary
analysis, a user must write scripts using Angr’s Python bind-
ings on a one-off basis.
The following is the following pattern that an Angr script
follows:
# Load binary
b_file = angr.Project(file_location)
# Specify starting instruction
start_addr = <addr>
state = binary_file.factory.blank_state(start_addr)
# Hook troublesome instructions to predefined replace-
ments
binary_file.hook(<addr>, <function>, length=instr_length)
# Mark memory as symbolic
state.memory.store(<addr>, state.se.BV(<name>, <bit len>))
# Perform analysis, seeking a path containing an in-
struction
p_group = b_file.factory.path_group(state)
p_group.explore(find=<addr>)
Results and Issues
Angr proved incapable in its current form to instrument and
analyze the ClamAV clamscan binary. Because Angr lifts
everything to an intermediate representation at the appli-
cation level, Angr struggles to simulate marking OS-level
components (such as files) as symbolic; additionally, Angr
is not able to handle symbolic execution of dynamic library
calls in its current state and would find difficulty in doing
so because it attempts to analyze the entire binary at once.
The major limit of Angr is that its transparency is limited
purely to the binary in question. This generally shouldn’t
be a problem for small binaries, but for a system as compli-
cated as a general-case antivirus suite, a suitable symbolic
execution framework must offer additional symbolic reach.
Framework 2: Triton
Triton is a symbolic execution framework which achieves
symbolic execution by performing symbolic execution and
taint analysis on top of conventional execution by instru-
menting the binary with Pintool. Because Triton uses Pin-
tool, it is more transparent than Angr in that it instruments
dynamically and has the potential (due to the use of Pintool)
to eventually interface with dynamically generated/loaded
code and in that it actually natively executes the binary.
Triton achieves symbolic execution via the following work-
flow:
1. Invoke the binary using Pin and a special Triton Pin-
tool which handles symbolic execution.
2. Internally update constraints and perform symbolic
operations ad-hoc during the instrumented execution
of the target binary.
Like Angr, a user must write scripts using Triton’s Python
bindings on a one-off basis, invoking the script through Tri-
ton’s packaged, modified version of Pin.
In order to perform instrumentation and perform binary
analysis, a user must write scripts using Angr’s Python bind-
ings on a one-off basis.
The following is the following pattern that a Triton script
follows:
# Only perform actions when invoked as main
if __name__ == ’__main__’:
# Specify address from which analysis should start
startAnalysisFromAddr(<addr>)
# Add callbacks(this is where you check addresses, sym-
bolic memory, etc
addCallback(<function>, IDREF.CALLBACK.AFTER)
# Start analysis
runProgram()
Once written, the Triton Python script is invoked as follows:
sudo ./triton clamav_extraction.py clamscan
-d testdb.db <file>
Results and Issues
Triton also proved incapable in its current form to instru-
ment and analyze the ClamAV clamscan library. Triton cur-
rently does not provide for use of Pintool’s support for in-
strumentation of dynamically loaded code; additionally, de-
spite offering slightly more transparency than Angr, Triton
still doesn’t provide a coherent means of marking OS-level
objects (such as files) as symbolic.
Triton’s greatest weakness is its incompleteness in imple-
mentation. It is currently not using Pintool to its fullest
potential, and it additionally faces trivial (yet critical) bugs,
such as out-of-memory errors and segmentation faults when
attempting to access a symbolic region of memory3
Framework 3: S2E
S2E (Selective Symbolic Execution) is a heavyweight sym-
bolic execution framework that offers a lot of power with
respect to dynamically instrumenting binaries.
S2E goes one step deeper than Triton, achieving symbolic
execution as follows:
1. Configure plugins for achieved functionality and out-
put for symbolic execution on the machine.
2. Initialize and run a virtual machine–using a modified
implementation of QEMU– that introduces custom op-
codes to perform symbolic execution at the hardware
level.
3. Once started, use S2E utilities to pull instrumentation
utilities from the host VM to the guest VM.
4. Use the main instrumentation utility, init_env.so, to
invoke the target binary as a blackbox with the desired
concrete and symbolic arguments from the guest VM,
performing the symbolic execution on the host with
KLEE.
S2E diverges from Triton and Angr in that it does not en-
courage or require writing scripts on a one-off basis: while it
is possible to write new plugins for S2E, their functionality
is expected to be generally applicable to all instrumented
binaries–not just one. This gives it a significant advantage
over the other two frameworks for the purpose of this project
in that a solution for one antivirus software suite would hy-
pothetically work for virtually all of them.
Another significant advantage to the S2E framework is that
it does allow for symbolic representation of OS-level objects,
providing utilities out of the box for writing and working
with symbolic files. With respect to the promises made by
the framework, S2E is the most promising framework to
house this project.
In order to use S2E to coerce detection using symbolic exe-
cution, the following workflow should be followed:
3Triton managed to bleed through Oracle VMWare’s Hy-
pervisor and crash my laptop when I tried to access a single
byte of symbolic memory.
1. Attain and put minimal S2E configuration in place.
Ensure that the TestCaseGenerator plugin is present
(this is a provided plugin which allows for symbolic
constraints to be directly converted to concrete exam-
ples as soon as divergent paths are found).
2. Start QEMU in S2E mode.
3. Using the S2E s2eget utility, pull instrumentation utilti-
ies from the host VM.
4. Use the S2E s2ecmd utility to write a symbolic file.
5. Invoke clamscan using init_env.so with the concrete
minimal malware database file and the symbolic file
created in the previous step.
6. Collect and analyze results from the host VM.
Results and Issues
For all the promising aspects of S2E, it still has some short-
comings which prevent complete application of the strategy
described for coercing detection in ClamAV. S2E is robust
enough to handle the complete symbolic execution of clam-
scan; however, S2E, despite having the capacity, does not
currently implement any way to handle symbolic execution
including dynamic library calls.
S2E also falls short in terms of documentation and disclosure
with respect to what features are completely implemented.
For example, S2E will follow through and attempt to exe-
cute clamscan symbolically; however, it handles its inabil-
ity to execute dynamic library calls symbolically by silently
concretizing symbolic arguments to the first possible exam-
ple, disallowing any real results to be obtained. Addition-
ally, S2E natively provides no way to select desired target
branches (something Triton and Angr do offer).
In spite of these issues, S2E provides the space and tools to
address these issues with more ease than Angr or Triton. If
a solution is devised for the dynamic library issue, it could
easily be implemented as a modification toinit_env.so; to
handle S2E’s issues with path selection, one could (given the
time) implement a plugin to cover this shortcoming.
Discussion and Conclusions
Of all three frameworks, S2E presents itself as being best-
suited to the task. Nevertheless, there are still two main
problem areas to be addressed before the method of this
project can be fully realized.
Issue: Dynamic Libraries
An issue faced by all three frameworks was the issue of dy-
namic libraries. None of these frameworks in their current
state are capable of handling dynamic libraries. In the case
of Angr and Triton, execution simply halts and crashes; how-
ever, in the case of S2E, the situation is somewhat mislead-
ing.
As shown in Figure 3, S2E silently concretizes symbolic in-
puts to external library functions. On return, the symbolic
variable is now the concretized value from before the sys-
tem call, preventing control from reaching the desired path
endpoint.
Figure 3: Handling of External Library Call in S2E
Issue: Path Explosion and Path Selection Heuris-
tics
An overarching problem facing symbolic and concolic execu-
tion in general is the path selection problem. To illustrate
what this is, exactly, consider the basic block structure given
in figures 1, 2, and 3. If the symbolic execution engine at-
tempts to explore all feasible paths of the program, and
the loop between the two central basic blocks is caused by
a while(true), then there could be an infinite number of
paths leading from main() to either endpoint, and the en-
gine might never feasibly reach one endpoint over the other.
Concolic execution mitigates this issue to an extent by con-
cretizing as much input space as possible; however, with the
number of possible endpoints and paths within a system as
large as an antivirus suite, heuristics must be available to
select one endpoint over another.
S2E does not provide such a means of path selection out of
the box, but it does provide the components necessary to
be able to write plugins to achieve the desired functionality
(Angr and Triton both implement some sort of heuristic to
achieve these, so an initial solution may be a port of these).
As it stands, when analysis is attempted in S2E, between
this and the previous issue, S2E simply is not able to reach
the desired program endpoint.
Future direction
In order to further the goals of this project, the above is-
sues must be resolved. S2E provides the technical tools and
capability required; however, plugins and modifications will
likely need to be implemented to fill the gaps.
A possible solution to both of these issues may lie in the
replay functionality KLEE implements (but S2E currently
doesn’t use).
Figure 4 shows a possible additional step before the analysis
issue which may contribute to resolving both issues currently
Figure 4: Solution Sketch: Pre-Analysis Map Exe-
cution
preventing progress towards this project’s goal. Before the
true symbolic execution of the binary of interest, provide it
first with a set of concrete inputs known to reach points of
execution of interest. For each of these inputs, execute the
program once with the input, and then use KLEE’s replay
functionality to map (1) where dynamic code is loaded and
(2) the basic blocks reached during execution using the in-
puts of interest. Then, while performing symbolic execution,
instrument dynamic calls to reuse the dynamically loaded
code from the external libraries (without concretizing sym-
bolic inputs), limiting path exploration to those including
points reached during the execution of the pre-run inputs.
It is suggested that this project be continued by imple-
menting new plugins for S2E and possibly by modifying
init_env.so to achieve the above. With these additional
components, S2E could be used to further explore the fea-
sibility and effectiveness of determining information about
malware signatures in antivirus software using concolic exe-
cution.
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